That was in 2013 and it’s taken more than a decade for us to wake up and realise it was all just a dream.
But if you turn back to the KPMG report ‘HS2 Regional Economic Impacts’, you will see it is littered with disclaimers suggesting, to the cynic, especially in hindsight, that the firm didn’t really believe its own conclusions.
The report declares: ‘Any party other than HS2 Ltd that obtains access to this report or a copy (under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, through HS2 Ltd’s Publication Scheme, or otherwise) and chooses to rely on it (or any part of it) does so at its own risk.’
It says: ‘We accept no responsibility for the consequences of this document being relied upon by any other party, or being used for any other purpose, or containing any error or omission which is due to an error or omission in data supplied to us by other parties.’
And it goes on: ‘Whilst KPMG LLP has undertaken the analysis in good faith, no warranty, expressed or implied, is made in respect of the accuracy, completeness or appropriateness of its assumptions, calculations or results. No reliance may be placed upon the analysis by any party, except where specifically referred to in an agreed KPMG LLP letter of engagement. All users are accordingly advised to undertake their own analysis and due diligence before making any decision or entering into any commitment based on the information in this report.’
It also points out, further distancing the firm from what its report says: ‘The project has been peer-reviewed by an advisory panel of independent experts set up by HS2 Ltd.’ And they say there ain’t no sanity clause….
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/05/hs2-report-overstated-benefits-expert
Pity they didn’t read my reports
In 2013, I wrote:
When it comes to a sensible, reasonable, rational assessment of whether the thing will provide value for money, though, our politicians fall back on a variety of reports.
These are commissioned by the Department for Transport and paid for by the Department for Transport so it rarely comes as a shock when they are widely trumpeted as proving the case for HS2.
I actually took the trouble to read the last one all the way through. The truth is I could not make head or tail of it. When it descended into rocket science, I knew I was lost.
In 2015:
Nobody really knows how much HS2 will cost when it’s finally opened. The official figure is now apparently £43 billion and Labour has said it would withdraw its support if the bill rose to more than £50 billion.
But it is said that in the corridors of power it is widely accepted that the bill will eventually come in at something like £73 billion.
It’s clearly the case with HS2 that the simplest way of estimating the cost is to think of a number – any number – and then double it.
There is no chance it will bring any added long-term prosperity to the West Midlands. Just as the true cost of HS2 is pure guesswork, so is its ability to create jobs. But whenever its backers come up with a number, halve it if you want something like the true picture.
And in 2016:
It’s probably unlikely the Birmingham to London high-speed trains will actually derail when they hit a top speed of 223 mph. Because the might never go that fast.
Research by engineer Prof Peter Woodward warns that at such a high speed there could be ‘significant issues’ with track instability.
The HS2 company says it’s taken into account the fact that its trains will run about 40 mph faster than the rest of the world’s high-speed trains and there’s nothing to worry about.
Let’s hope so because speed of travel is one of the key arguments for building the line in the first place. If trains can’t actually go as fast as advertised then, even if they don’t crash, the whole financial case for this infinitely costly (latest guesstimate now £55.7 billion) line will certainly run into the buffers.
No comments:
Post a Comment